Like I mentioned a few days ago, Experiment 2 of my dissertation project -- Project 15 -- is finished with data collection. I've been slowly working my way through the data (have been busy with some other projects) and I like how things are looking.
Just to summarize, we have people come into the lab and ask them to learn 100 words from semantic categories. After a distractor task, we give them a test on 300 items: the 100 targets (words they studied), 100 related lures (unstudied words from studied categories), and 100 unrelated lures (unstudied words from unstudied categories). On this recognition test, one of the 300 words is displayed and subjects respond "old" or "new." Following this judgment, a 0-100 confidence rating is provided. Last, for words to which subjects responded "old," they make a remember/know/guess judgment. A remember judgment is provided when subjects can recollect the episode of the word's prior presentation. A know judgment is provided when subjects can't recollect the episode, but know that the word was presented. Last, subjects respond guess when they were just guessing the word is old.
The next thing to do is investigate the confidence-accuracy correlation as a function of remember, know, or guess. We can do that with scatterplots. Here we go:
Using the terminology we used in DeSoto and Roediger (2014) , these scatterplots depict the between-subjects correlation, which indicates the degree to which confident subjects are more accurate. And what these data show is that confident subjects are similarly more accurate when responding remember or know, but there's not much relation in the guess responses.
And here's another one:
Again using prior terminology (i.e., DeSoto & Roediger, 2014), these scatterplots depict the between-events correlation, which indicates the degree to which items responded to with greater confidence are also responded to with greater accuracy. These data, like the prior one, show that increases in remembering are not substantially more predictive than increases in knowing. (But, like before, guesses are guesses.)